Algeria has long positioned itself as a champion of «just causes», notably Western Sahara and Palestine. Yet its record during its tenure on the United Nations Security Council tells a very different story. The 2024–2025 term has marked an unprecedented weakening of Algerian diplomacy. Ahmed Attaf, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the UN Security Council / DR ‹ › Algeria's term as a non-permanent African member of the UN Security Council will end on December 31, 2025. This mandate has been marked by two notable setbacks on issues that Algerian authorities consider core national priorities: Western Sahara and Palestine. During this period, the Security Council adopted two resolutions on the Sahara, Resolution 2756 on October 31, 2024, and Resolution 2797 on October 31, 2025. To the dismay of Polisario supporters, Algeria did not take part in either vote. Algiers could have voted against the texts or, at the very least, abstained, as Russia and Mozambique did in 2024, despite Maputo's recognition of the so-called «Sahrawi Republic», and as Russia, China, and Pakistan did in 2025. Instead, Algeria chose non-participation, effectively sidelining its declared commitments to the Polisario. This cautious stance is likely adopted to avoid tensions with the United States, the penholder of both resolutions, under both the Biden and Trump administrations. Explanations later provided by Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf for this absence were widely seen as unconvincing. Algiers More at Ease Under Democratic Leadership Under the Democratic administration, Algeria maintained sustained dialogue with Washington. This was reflected in visits by former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Algiers in March 2022 and August 2024, as well as frequent exchanges with his Algerian counterparts, first Ramtane Lamamra and later Ahmed Attaf. Discussions focused in particular on the war in Gaza and attacks on shipping in the Red Sea by Houthi militias in Yemen. During Joe Biden's presidency, Algeria and the United States also held several sessions of their bilateral Strategic Dialogue, including a meeting on military cooperation in Washington in December 2023. These contacts, supported by a group of U.S. senators and representatives, helped persuade the White House to delay the implementation of measures announced under Donald Trump recognizing Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, including the opening of a U.S. consulate in Dakhla. Donald Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, however, reactivated these frozen decisions. Once again, Algeria avoided taking a firm stand at the Security Council, opting for a low-profile approach, as reflected in its restrained intervention during the adoption of Resolution 2797 on October 31. Palestinians Also Left Disappointed Algeria's caution extended to the Palestinian issue. On November 18, it voted in favor of President Trump's plan to end the war in Gaza, while Russia and China abstained. The plan, consisting of 20 points and negotiated months earlier between Donald Trump and the Israeli prime minister, provides for the deployment of a temporary «international stabilization force» in Gaza under unified command. This force would cooperate with Israel, Egypt, and Palestinian police units to secure borders, demilitarize Gaza, dismantle military and terrorist infrastructure, and protect civilians during humanitarian operations. Notably, the plan excludes Hamas and Islamic Jihad from any post-war political arrangement, despite both movements urging Algeria not to support Resolution 2803. Their appeal went unanswered. Growing Diplomatic Isolation The distancing from both the Polisario and the Palestinians reflects a broader erosion of Algeria's diplomatic influence, particularly in Africa and Europe. Algiers is increasingly isolated. In the Sahel, relations with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are now close to rupture, an ironic development given that these countries once formed the Tamanrasset Coordination, launched by Algeria in 2009 to combat terrorism. Across Africa more broadly, Algeria's diplomatic standing would have declined even further without the support of its South African ally. Within the Arab world, Algeria's influence has also waned. It was notably excluded from a Saudi-hosted meeting on Syria in April 2023, underscoring its growing marginalization among Arab partners. In Europe, Algeria's confrontational approach toward Spain and France over Western Sahara has yielded little. Retaliatory measures against Madrid and Paris failed to change their positions, as both continue to back Morocco's autonomy plan. The European Union, meanwhile, strongly opposed Algeria's economic retaliation against Spain. Declining Gas Leverage This loss of influence is likely to deepen in the coming months, particularly following the entry into force on August 7 of the EU-U.S. trade agreement. Under the deal, EU member states committed to purchasing $750 billion worth of American energy products by 2028, in exchange for reduced U.S. tariffs set at 15% instead of the initially threatened 30%. Spain has already offset part of its reduced Algerian gas imports with U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG). Just one month after the agreement, Italian energy company Edison, controlled by France's EDF, cut back its imports of Algerian gas in favor of American LNG. Should Donald Trump also succeed in brokering peace in Ukraine, the return of Russian gas to European markets would further accelerate the erosion of Algeria's energy leverage and geopolitical weight.
