The Sahara issue remains one of the longest-running regional conflicts. Initially, the UN sought to resolve it through a self-determination referendum, but after nine years, the plan proved impractical, leading to new proposals, first the Framework Agreement, then a partition plan, and finally Morocco's Autonomy Initiative in 2007. This initiative marked a turning point, as the UN Security Council gradually adopted it as the basis for negotiations, culminating in its historic 2025 resolution, which established autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the sole framework for future talks. On April 29, 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 690, establishing the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in accordance with the settlement plan jointly accepted by Morocco and the Polisario Front in 1988. The Settlement Plan: A Basis for Negotiation and a Source of Dispute The plan, proposed by the UN Secretary-General and the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), envisioned a transitional period during which the people of Western Sahara would vote either for independence or integration with Morocco. However, while the framework appeared clear in principle, it contained the seeds of crisis, notably, it failed to clearly define voter eligibility criteria, leaving room for conflicting interpretations between the parties. On March 2, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 809, expressing concern over «the difficulties and delays encountered in the implementation of the Settlement Plan regarding the question of Western Sahara and in particular the persistent divergences between the two parties on the interpretation and application of the criteria for voter eligibility», and urged for its implementation «without further delay in order to achieve a just and lasting solution». This marked the first formal acknowledgment that the plan had stalled. The main obstacle was no longer the principle of self-determination, but rather the question: «Who has the right to vote?», a complex legal and political issue. By 1995, the Security Council had adopted five resolutions on Western Sahara, all recognizing delays in implementing the settlement plan and reaffirming its commitment to holding a «free, fair, and impartial referendum». In Resolution 1017 (September 22, 1995), it even warned of the possible withdrawal of MINURSO due to lack of progress. In 1996, three more resolutions were issued, expressing frustration at the stalemate. Resolution 1042 denounced the «stalemate which has been hindering the identification process», while Resolution 1056 noted that, despite challenges, 60,000 individuals had been identified before the Identification Commission was temporarily suspended. In 1997, six more resolutions called on Morocco and the Polisario to organize the promised referendum, followed by seven in 1998 welcoming the resumption of voter identification and the start of appeals. The UN Shifts Away from the Settlement Plan Nine years after MINURSO's creation, the referendum had still not taken place, even though the plan had scheduled it for January 1992. By 2000, the UN Secretary-General began hinting that holding a referendum was no longer viable. In his February 17, 2000 report, he wrote: «I intend to ask my Special Envoy, James A. Baker III, to consult with the parties and explore ways and means of reaching a rapid, durable, and mutually agreed solution to the conflict». This marked a pivotal shift, from implementing the plan to seeking an alternative solution. In May 2000, the Secretary-General confirmed that the prospects of organizing the referendum are «more distant than ever». Reflecting this change, Resolution 1292 (February 29, 2000) called for exploring «ways and means to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute». Realizing that the settlement plan had become unworkable due to disagreements over voter eligibility, the international community, led by France and the United States, urged the Secretary-General to propose a new approach. This led to the Framework Agreement, presented in June 2000 by James Baker. The proposal granted the people of the Sahara local executive, legislative, and judicial authority, while Morocco retained control over foreign affairs and defense. After five years, the territory's final status would be decided by a referendum limited to residents who had lived in the Sahara for at least one year prior. The Framework Agreement as a New Basis for Negotiation The Security Council formally moved away from the settlement plan in Resolution 1359 (June 29, 2001), encouraging both sides to discuss and amend the Framework Agreement. Later, Resolution 1429 (July 30, 2002) stressed the urgent need «to find a political solution» given the persistent deadlock. As Algeria found itself increasingly isolated for rejecting the Framework Agreement, it proposed an unprecedented territorial partition: Morocco would retain Saguia el-Hamra (two-thirds of the territory), while the Polisario Front would establish a state in Oued Eddahab (the remaining third). Morocco swiftly rejected this division proposal, as noted in the UN Secretary-General's report of May 22, 2003. The Security Council continued referencing the Framework Agreement in its subsequent resolutions, including Resolution 1495 (July 31, 2003). The Autonomy Initiative and the Search for a Realistic Solution The stalemate persisted until 2007, when Morocco presented its Autonomy Initiative for the Sahara. In Resolution 1754 (April 30, 2007), the Security Council took note of the proposal and welcomed Morocco's «serious and credible efforts» to advance the peace process. The Polisario Front responded with a counterproposal based on the original settlement plan, one the UN had already deemed impracticable. The Council merely «took note» of the Polisario's submission, while describing Morocco's plan as the only serious and credible basis for progress. This formulation was repeated in Resolutions 1813 (2008), 1871 (2009), and 1920 (2010), through to Resolution 2756 (October 31, 2024). Over time, these resolutions converged on one formula: the Security Council supports efforts to achieve a «just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution that ensures self-determination for the people of Western Sahara». This was not just diplomatic language, it reflected a growing consensus that autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty represents the most realistic and sustainable solution. In April 2025, UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura addressed the Security Council, urging Morocco to «deepen and expand» its autonomy plan: «Autonomy must be serious. This aligns with my conviction that the Moroccan initiative should be further clarified, especially regarding the powers granted to an entity with genuine self-governance». Since 2007, Morocco has maintained that autonomy is «a point of arrival, not a starting point», while securing support from major international players including France, Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Autonomy as the Sole Framework for Negotiation On October 31, 2025, the UN Security Council adopted a historic resolution, affirming that granting genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty represents «could constitute a most feasible solution» to the five-decade-long dispute. Eleven of the 15 Council members voted in favor, while Russia, China, and Pakistan abstained, and Algeria did not participate. The resolution calls on all parties to engage in negotiations based on Morocco's 2007 autonomy proposal. Following its adoption, King Mohammed VI addressed the Moroccan people, reaffirming that Morocco will «update and elaborate on the autonomy initiative and present it to the United Nations as the sole basis for negotiation, a practical and viable solution».
