In its early years, the Polisario Front avoided relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Libya. This caution stemmed from their fear of Algeria's reaction, as Algeria exerted relatively strict control over the movement's decisions, reveals a CIA document. Since its inception, the Polisario Front has been aware of its inability to establish relations with outside countries or organizations without Algeria's approval. This explains its reluctance, during the 1970s and 1980s, to consider a strong alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), a then-superpower. A CIA document dated April 1, 1983, and declassified in July 2011, states that Algeria «can control the Libyan-Polisario relationship». In this regard, the US intelligence agency states that Algeria «would not permit collaboration that would in any hurt Algerian authorities». This includes «ruling on transit rights for Libyan weapons bound for the Polisario and requiring other forms of Libyan assistance to the Guerillas and their dependents to pass through Algerian checkpoints». Moreover, the document describes Libya as «the Polisario's other key patron», as Tripoli has supplied the latter with «most of its major weapons systems». In addition to «armors, SA-6 missiles, and multiple rocket launchers», Libya was prepared to continue its support for the rebels. However, the separatist movement did not consider Muammar Gaddafi a «reliable supporter». As part of a rapprochement with Morocco to re-establish diplomatic relations, Gaddafi aimed to gain the support of King Hassan II (1961-1999). To achieve this, the Libyan leader suspended aid to the Polisario militias. This bilateral agreement, called the Oujda Treaty, proved short-lived, and Tripoli soon resumed its support. For the separatists, these events solidified Algeria's position as their «primary benefactor», indeed «the only one capable of providing sustained safehaven and logistical support». The USSR and Cuba Further on, the document confirms the Soviet Union's «overturns to the Polisario offering direct assistance, including weapons». However, the separatists remain «reluctant to establish a direct link with Moscow for fear it would jeopardize the all-important relationship with the Algerians, who want to avoid internationalizing the conflict». In the past, according to the document, Algeria sought to «reduce its reliance on the Soviet Union and improve relations with the United States». It also feared that «Soviet investment in the Polisario would only elicit greater US aid to Morocco and could push Morocco and Algeria into direct confrontation». The document explains that the Polisario Front has «openly threatened to seek Soviet aid, but it is ambivalent about following through». «Although we believe it unlikely at this point, the Polisario may eventually calculate that internationalizing the dispute and accepting Soviet assistance is the only way to succeed and that Algeria - although it has great leverage over the Polisario- cannot for domestic political reasons afford to exercise it fully». CIA The document continues: «Although the Polisario ha rebuffed most offers of military aid from Cuba, it has accepted some assistance. We have been unable to confirm Moroccan charges that a large numbers of Cuban advisors have operated with the Polisario in the Western Sahara. A significant escalation of Cuban assistance to the front would be viewed by Algeria in much the same way as close Soviet-Polisario ties and thus would present guerrilla leadership with similar risks. We do not believe the Polisario would defy Algeria unless its prospects fail to improve». The Polisario Front, a tool of hostility for Algeria against Morocco With regard to Mauritania, the document states that it has not provided «any assistance to the Polisario, but has been unable to prevent the guerillas from using its territory». «President Haidalla, while sympathetic to the guerillas' cause, wants to remain outside the conflict», the CIA points out. As long as the Algerians maintain relatively tight control over the Polisario Front, the document concludes, it is unlikely that the militias will be able to seriously challenge Morocco in a way that could destabilize the country in the short term. The CIA informs, in this sense, that due to a change in internal problems, leadership, or concerns about Moroccan offensive tactics, Algeria could use the Polisario Front as an appropriate tool to mobilize against Rabat, whether in a military or diplomatic context.
