As the date of the Green March in 1975 approached, the Sahara was on the brink of becoming a potential battlefield. While tens of thousands of Moroccans were preparing to cross the borders in a peaceful march, the Spanish military leadership was devising a strict defensive plan called «Operation Marabunta» to defend to the end the city of Laayoune. In the lead-up to the Green March in November 1975, Spain's army stationed in the Sahara was preparing for a potential military escalation with Morocco. The book «The Conflict in Western Sahara», published by Spain's Ministry of Defense and written by Ignacio Fuente Sopo and Fernando Mariño Menéndez, reveals that the Spanish General Staff had drawn up an emergency plan called «Operation Marabunta». The plan's objective was to prevent any Moroccan advance toward Laâyoune, then the strategic stronghold of Spanish forces in the region. According to the book, Spanish military authorities were unaware of the secret negotiations taking place between Madrid and Rabat over the transfer of the Sahara. As early as October 4, they cleared a 10-kilometer strip in the northern part of the region and erected double fences stretching from east to west along the road connecting the northern border to El Hagounia. Mines, artillery, and tanks Between these fences, a field of antipersonnel mines was laid. The authors note that this defensive setup was meant to channel Moroccan marchers and troops along two specific routes: the coastal road between Tarfaya and Laâyoune, and the inland route from the border to El Hagounia, before turning toward Laâyoune. These details are corroborated by retired Spanish General Adolfo Coloma, who stated in an interview: «There was another minefield behind us, but it was fake. The real one was about seven kilometers away, surrounded by fences and marked with signs in Arabic and Spanish: Danger Mines». The main line of defense was concentrated in Laâyoune, where Spanish forces were preparing for a «fight to the end», with no possibility of retreat. Three tactical groups were deployed to block advances from the north and east, while another group was kept in reserve as a final line of defense. The troops stationed in Laâyoune were equipped with self-propelled artillery capable of creating a «curtain of fire» to repel an attack, while a medium tank brigade stood ready to launch counterattacks or exploit any breakthrough. Two paratrooper brigades were to be deployed from mainland Spain to reinforce the defense of Laâyoune. At the time, around 20,000 Spanish soldiers were stationed in the Sahara, more than half of them concentrated in the city. The Spanish forces were supported by the navy, which patrolled the coast and secured supply lines from the Canary Islands. According to the book, «the defensive position in Laâyoune appeared impregnable». On October 28, the Spanish army disbanded its remaining Sahrawi troops, fearing that in such a tense climate they might turn against their Spanish officers. Despite the warlike atmosphere, the authors point out that the Moroccan army was not prepared to confront Spain directly. Morocco's air bases were too distant, and there was the constant risk of a Spanish landing behind Moroccan lines. Instead, the Kingdom focused its efforts on supplying and organizing the thousands of civilians who were preparing to take part in the Green March. Difficult negotiations While the Spanish army was preparing for a possible conflict, political negotiations were taking a new turn. On October 18, just three days before the launch of the Green March, Spanish Minister José Solís met with King Hassan II in Marrakech, informing him that Spain was ready to cede the Sahara. That same day, the Spanish General Staff received orders to launch "Operation Swallow" (Operación Golondrina) — a full-scale evacuation plan for the Sahara, including the withdrawal of 10,000 European civilians, under joint Spanish-Moroccan security guarantees. King Hassan II was well aware of Spain's political fragility, as General Franco lay on his deathbed. This instability presented Morocco with a strategic opportunity to press its territorial claims over the Sahara. On November 6, Morocco issued an ultimatum through its Minister of Information, Ahmed Taïeb Benhima, urging Spain to resume negotiations over the territory. Facing the possibility that the Green March would continue across barbed wire and minefields, Spain found itself cornered. A tacit agreement between Madrid and Rabat allowed the marchers to advance ten kilometers into the Sahara, camp for 48 hours, and then withdraw peacefully. Hassan II's gamble King Hassan II, however, knew that he could not stop the march without achieving a tangible victory. A failure would have turned nationalist sentiment against him, while keeping tens of thousands of marchers indefinitely at the border risked domestic unrest and health crises. He therefore chose to take a calculated risk, fully aware that failure could lead to war — one that Morocco was ill-prepared to fight under the existing conditions. On November 7, more than 100,000 Moroccan marchers crossed the border, opening a second front in the east, in an area left undefended by Spanish forces. The following day, Spanish Minister of the Presidency Antonio Carro traveled to Agadir, accompanied by Spain's ambassador to Morocco, for tense negotiations with Moroccan officials. On November 9, Carro met with King Hassan II, who took a firm and resolute stance. The Spanish envoy pledged to deliver a message from his government promising to cede the Sahara in exchange for halting the Green March. With Madrid's approval, the minister handed over a formal letter emphasizing the importance of preserving mutual interests and international peace, and committing to resume negotiations once the march had stopped. Morocco had achieved its objective. The very next day, the Green March folded camp and began its journey back north. The Madrid Accords On November 12, Moroccan and Mauritanian delegations arrived in Madrid to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty. Two days later, the Madrid Accords were signed, officially sealing the fate of the Sahara. Spain agreed to withdraw completely by February 28, 1976. Under the agreement, Morocco regained the northern part of the territory, forming three provinces — Laâyoune, Smara, and Boujdour — while Mauritania assumed control of the southern portion, renamed Tiris El-Gharbia, organized into three administrative regions: Dakhla, Aousserd, and La Güera. On February 28, 1976, the Spanish flag was lowered for the last time and replaced by the Moroccan flag. That night, the final Spanish soldiers and officials left the territory, ending more than ninety years of colonial presence. Shortly before, on October 30, the first units of the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces had already crossed the border, taking control of abandoned Spanish positions as far as Mahbes — a zone briefly occupied by the Algerian army before it withdrew to avoid direct confrontation.
