The return of Sahrawis from the Tindouf camps, the scope of diplomatic powers, the procedures for appointing the head of the autonomous government, and the management of natural resources in the Saharan provinces have emerged as the main points of disagreement raised by the Polisario Front and Algeria during the U.S.-initiated discussions. DR ‹ › U.S.-led discussions on the Western Sahara issue have highlighted significant differences between Morocco on one side and the Algeria–Polisario Front camp on the other. Although Washington has succeeded in establishing autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the sole framework for negotiations, substantial challenges remain. One of the main sticking points concerns the appointment of the head of the future regional government. The position would go to the party that wins the regional elections. Morocco maintains that this appointment must be validated by the King, in accordance with Article 47 of the Constitution, thereby reaffirming the Kingdom's sovereignty over the territory. The Polisario Front, however, argues that the investiture should be the exclusive prerogative of the autonomous parliament. The return of camp populations Resolving the conflict inevitably raises the issue of the Sahrawis still living in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, a particularly sensitive matter. The Polisario demands that the right of return apply to all camp residents, whom it estimates at more than 160,000 people. Morocco, for its part, says it is prepared to welcome only those Sahrawis who left the territory, voluntarily or forcibly, in the 1970s. According to Morocco's permanent representative to the United Nations, Omar Hilale, their number does not exceed 20,000. From the UN podium, the ambassador has repeatedly reaffirmed the Kingdom's readiness to receive them, stating that they are «Moroccans». This position effectively excludes a significant portion of camp residents, including Algerian Sahrawis, Mauritanians, and even Malian Tuaregs, some of whom are said to serve within the Polisario's military or administrative structures led by Brahim Ghali. This issue presents a complex challenge for U.S. diplomacy. It is worth recalling that the UN abandoned the referendum option in 2002, citing persistent obstacles faced by its voter identification commission. In this context, the Polisario also demands that, for a period of ten years, residents of the Sahara who are not of Sahrawi origin be barred from participating in elections for the autonomous parliament. Such a measure would exclude certain tribes from voting, an approach the Polisario has defended for decades. On June 20, 2000, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported to the Security Council that the identification process for the planned referendum had been stalled since late 1995. He attributed the deadlock to the Polisario Front's opposition to including members of the «Tribes del Norte» and «Costeras del Sur», although they had been registered by Spain in 1974. Diplomacy and natural resources The scope of diplomatic powers is another point of friction. The Polisario wants the future autonomous government to conduct its own parallel diplomacy. Rabat rejects this, insisting that sovereign powers remain exclusively within the authority of the central state. However, Morocco has indicated it could allow the autonomous executive to conclude international cooperation agreements under state supervision. The management of natural resources is equally contentious. The Polisario calls for the region's wealth to be shared with Morocco. Rabat dismisses this demand, arguing that natural resources fall under national sovereignty and must be managed within the Kingdom's institutional framework. Finally, Morocco maintains that it would reserve the right to suspend autonomy in the event of serious public order disturbances, a position it compares to Spain's decision in October 2017 to suspend Catalonia's autonomy following the independence referendum.
